With both the so-called Mrdić laws and the election of members of the High Prosecutorial Council, legal provisions and institutions have been misused in order to strengthen political influence over the judiciary
The empty seat of Serbia’s liaison prosecutor at Eurojust is already slowing down ongoing investigations at both national and international levels. It is clear that the executive branch opposes the reappointment of the current liaison prosecutor, regardless of the damage this causes to Serbia’s reputation in its relations with the European Union. This suggests that certain actions undertaken by the previous prosecutor may have threatened the vital interests of the ruling party. Through her work, she enabled direct cooperation with national prosecution bodies, particularly the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, and proceedings before this institution are now being delayed.
The Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime is persistently being deprived of key operational tools from multiple directions. One of those tools is Eurojust, through which various forms of support are provided for prosecuting organised crime cases with a cross-border dimension.
At a time when the European Union is closely monitoring the conduct of the authorities in relation to the judiciary, the adoption of the so-called “Mrdić laws”, which have also affected the Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime, sends a clear signal that the liaison prosecutor is not a position open to negotiation.
The fact that the High Prosecutorial Council holds the key and final say over prosecutorial appointments is clearly at odds with the ruling majority
For any state genuinely committed to combating crime, it is unacceptable to allow a vacuum in the conduct of investigations. On the contrary, a timely appointment of a new liaison prosecutor, with a delayed start of mandate, should have ensured a transition period during which the new appointee could familiarise themselves with ongoing cases. According to Eurojust’s latest annual report, Serbia was involved in as many as 88 cases in 2024 alone.
Depending on the speed of appointment, the integrity of the new public prosecutor, and the future implementation of the Mrdić laws – which ambiguously introduce the Ministry of Justice into international cooperation cases – it will largely be determined whether such cooperation will continue to be effectively utilised in proceedings before Serbian courts.
The fact that the High Prosecutorial Council currently holds the key and final authority over personnel decisions within the prosecution is clearly an obstacle for the ruling majority.
The current division of interests within the Council has contributed to the deadlock in appointing a liaison prosecutor. The Government will likely argue that it is not responsible for the delay, claiming that the decision lies with an “independent body”.
The blockage of appointments, including that of the liaison prosecutor to Eurojust, will be attributed to a supposedly “detached” segment of the prosecution, one that is portrayed as being detached from the “state”. The only way for the ruling majority to regain control over кадровска решења is to rely on other institutions – the National Assembly, by adopting laws that weaken the High Prosecutorial Council, or the Constitutional Court, by overturning its decisions. This has already been seen with the Mrdić laws and the election of Council members. In both cases, legal provisions and institutions have been misused to strengthen political influence over the judiciary.
