In recent months, several heads of police units crucial for citizens’ safety and crime prevention have been replaced. Given the reputation of the new leadership, the public has justified fears of increased repression against those who express dissatisfaction with the authorities. However, these developments within the police also endanger the safety of all other citizens.
The new head of the Criminal Police Directorate (UKP), Marko Kričak, is a former commander of the Unit for the Protection of Persons and Facilities (JZO). Beyond its usual duties, this unit was involved in suppressing protests, and Kričak and other JZO officers have been reported multiple times for the abuse of students. His former deputy, Igor Žmirić, has become commander of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ), despite also being implicated in cases of police brutality. The Gendarmerie has also received a new commander, Radoslav Rebac, who previously headed the Police Brigade that secured the so-called “Ćacilend” during the largest unrest. The new head of the Service for Combating Organized Crime (SBPOK) is another former JZO member, Marko Zafirović, remembered for suppressing the blockade by students at the Fifth Belgrade Gymnasium. JZO itself has also received a new head, Ivan Ristić, a former member of the Special Operations Unit (JSO), whose members assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić and were linked to the Zemun Clan; according to journalists, an international complaint for migrant smuggling had also been filed against him.
Given the biographies of those now leading the Serbian police and the broader political context—marked by captured institutions, human rights violations, and social unrest—the public rightly questions whether these replacements signal an introduction to even greater repression against those not aligned with the authorities.
Within the strictly hierarchical structure of the police, control over all officers is easily established. Police officers are obliged to carry out (lawful) orders and to inform their superiors of all actions, obtaining approval for planned activities. For example, supervisors sign initiatives for searches, expert examinations, identifications, or reports submitted to prosecutors and courts. In such an organizational framework, leadership has almost unlimited resources to initiate investigations against demonstrators, including cases in which students are accused of undermining the constitutional order. Given that investigative materials were also misused through publication in pro-government media, it is clear that such investigations benefit the regime. In addition, those who engage in civil disobedience have faced surveillance, summonses, detention at police stations, pre-trial detention, and other forms of intimidation. The most serious cases, however, involved police brutality, particularly by members of JZO, as well as the Police Brigade, the Gendarmerie, and the Intervention Police Unit (IJP).
From the positions of heads of the UKP, SBPOK, and the Service for Special Investigative Methods—which, according to media reports, has also received a new chief—virtually all investigations that could threaten individuals in power are controlled. These include the financial investigation related to the collapse of the canopy, or the “General Staff” case, in which the Prosecutor’s Office for Organized Crime is not receiving adequate police support. In such complex cases, the police should secure evidence through covert surveillance, on-site inspections, or searches. If cooperation between prosecutors and the police is lacking, these actions cannot be carried out swiftly and effectively, and key evidence may be lost. For instance, based on information obtained during witness questioning, a prosecutor may decide that an urgent inspection or search is necessary without a court warrant. With good communication, the police would act on the prosecutor’s oral request. Conversely, a supervisor can “sabotage” the process by insisting on a written request, which may take hours or days to obtain—by which time crucial evidence may disappear. An even clearer example of the prosecution’s “dependence” on the police is found in the application of special investigative measures. Supervisors and officers conducting covert surveillance are the first to access new data, which may never reach the prosecutor’s office. One technique for undermining prosecutorial work is the reassignment of police officers with whom prosecutors cooperate, as occurred in cases involving money flows linked to the canopy collapse and the seizure of a record quantity of marijuana in Serbia connected to local leadership of the Serbian Progressive Party. Prosecutorial power is limited by police actions in all proceedings, which is why there is an initiative to introduce a prosecutorial police.
Beyond endangering those engaged in civil disobedience and undermining proceedings that could implicate individuals in power, the consequences of these changes may affect all citizens. Traditionally, the police in Serbia enjoy a moderate level of public trust—higher than that of political parties and NGOs, but lower than that of the army and the church. Among security and judicial institutions, firefighters and the army are trusted more, while courts and prosecutors are trusted less. Although there are no measurements from the past year, it appears unlikely that public satisfaction increased following police brutality against demonstrators, scandals such as the disappearance of seized weapons from police stations, and cases of abuse and deaths of detainees in custody. One indicator of the damaged public image of the police is the drastic decline in interest in police employment. In addition to increased workloads due to social unrest, poor response to police recruitment calls may explain why the Ministry of Interior has “recalled” officers from retirement.
On the other hand, police work is based on cooperation with citizens. Beat officers and patrols collect information relevant to policing through contact with citizens and inform them about issues affecting their safety. When police intervene following reports—such as domestic violence or bar fights—the outcome depends on communication and cooperation with citizens. A significant portion of general police work consists of operational or security checks for firearms permits, private security licenses, employment in state bodies, or work in security-sensitive areas, as well as address verifications, delivery of court documents, and assistance to other authorities. All these tasks depend on information from citizens and community relations. Even in criminal investigations conducted by plainclothes inspectors, success largely depends on information gathered from victims, witnesses, or collaborators. Given the scale of the student movement and civic protests over the past year and more, it is clear that police–citizen cooperation has been significantly affected by what occurred during the protests. When the police lack legitimacy—when citizens do not trust them or view them as fair—their ability to ensure public safety is compromised.
In addition to community relations, the exhaustive use of security resources to suppress the student movement and demonstrations has also impacted crime prevention. Officers deployed to the IJP—formed within each regional police administration—are drawn from general policing and traffic police. Traffic officers are engaged to manage traffic during public gatherings, while plainclothes officers among the crowds come from general policing or criminal police departments. Given that many of these officers have spent much of their working time dealing with protests and students, it is unsurprising that street crime has increased, manifested in extortion, arson and explosive devices in hospitality venues, bomb attacks, and the kidnapping of public figures.
Although the Police Directorate announced at the end of 2025 that overall crime had fallen by 5 percent, criminological research shows that official statistics suffer from a “dark figure” of unreported crimes, which depends on the socio-political context and trust in institutions. In Serbia, alongside social unrest and police brutality during 2025, there are chronic problems that undermine trust in the system, such as weak victim protection and revictimization in criminal proceedings, and a high perception of corruption. In such a context, the gap between official crime statistics and reality may be substantial.
Finally, it is evident that police officers themselves are demotivated by the circumstances. Although they “speak loudly by remaining silent”—with no official data on internal dissatisfaction—this is reflected in statements by certain unions and media reports. For example, reports on the situation within the SAJ describe personnel changes and pressures that have led some members to leave the unit. Beyond the precedent of deploying JZO to control protests, changes within the SAJ lack justification, given that it handles the highest-risk tasks such as arresting members of organized criminal groups or terrorists. It all began with the reported retirement of former commander Spasoje Vulević, allegedly after he refused to deploy the SAJ at protests. In such circumstances, it is clear that police officers are being maneuvered like pawns on a chessboard to keep the regime in power, rather than to fulfill their primary role—ensuring the safety of citizens.
Author: Dušan Stanković, Associate at Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
